

---

# 传播符号学



---

## Media Theory: The Turn from Humanism to Anti-Humanism

Xianguang Peter Zhang

**Abstract:** This article traces the shift in media theory from humanism to anti-humanism, or from extensionism to assemblage theory and machinism. The suggestion is that the anti-humanistic orientation illuminates the human condition even better, especially in the post-industrial and digital ages when Kafkaesque absurdity characterizes human life. The article also points, if only in passing, to the relevance of interology to media-theoretic inquiry.

**Keywords:** extensionism, assemblage, machinism, apparatus, megamachine, McLuhan, Deleuze, Flusser, Mumford

**DOI:** 10.13760/b.cnki.sam.202301015

*The peonies all bloomed red one day,  
And throughout the town the noble sons got drunk.*<sup>①</sup> (Hori, 2010, p. 438)

### I. Introduction

Generally speaking, media studies have two traditions: the one is content-oriented whereas the other is medium-oriented. Media theory belongs to the latter. It is more or less synonymous with media ecology, and overlaps significantly with

---

<sup>①</sup> The epigraph can be read as a figurative description of media effect.

philosophy of technology, techno-ethics, and media philosophy. It is also closely related with interality studies.<sup>①</sup> For media are interological phenomena. The atrophy and revival of the interological sensibility in the West have a lot to do with the evolution of media. This article compares the humanist view of media with the anti-humanist view. Marshall McLuhan's (1994) notion of media as extensions of man is an example of the former. The discussion of the latter will be limited to assemblage theory and machinism.

## II. Extensionism, or the Humanist View

Humanity qua humanity is characterized by the use of its body or itself as the measure of all things, including nature, eventually creating a human-based world. This world is anthropomorphic, anthropocentric, and anthropotropic (in the same way plants are phototropic). The contrapuntality between technical objects and humans pervades this artificial world. There is contrapuntality between hand and handle, between keyboard and fingers. To use McLuhan's expression, media are like humanity's mechanical bride, who rests her head on the left arm of the bridegroom and turns along with him. In the final analysis, the world humanity inhabits is made up of media. Media are humanity's dwelling. Humanity is the content of media. Media are humanity's externalization (i. e., what McLuhan calls uttering and outering) (McLuhan & Powers, 1989, p. 7). In this sense, humanity resembles strikingly the silkworm that creates a cocoon to bind itself. Media are to humanity as the cocoon is to the silkworm. The traditional Chinese ideograph for cocoon/*jian* indicates silk that binds up a worm all over, and the one for silkworm/*can* indicates two worms lurking in wait for the sun. To allude to Friedrich Nietzsche's book title, the world humanity inhabits is one that is "human, all too human".

---

<sup>①</sup> "Interality" is a polysemic term. The core senses include: betweenness, middle, liminality, interval, relationality, symbiosis, counterpoint, distance, and antiform, etc. The author has guest-edited six special issues/sections of scholarly articles on interality/interology and written extensively on the topic. Lately, he has been working on an interological philosophy of media with a focus on the notion of "medium as *khora*". The project is an extension of the 2019 article, "Toward an Interality-Oriented Philosophy (IOP) of the Digital", and the 2021 article, "Deleuze and *Khora*". The terms "interality" and "interology/interology" were both coined by Geling Shang (2015).

The genealogy of media starts with humanity, or humanity's self-consciousness, and its bionic impulse. Nearby, humanity models after its own body, and afar, it models after other things. The motive force is humanity's will to freedom, even though the outcome may well be its bondage. The waterslide is a replay of the fear and joy accompanying birth. The helicopter is the dragonfly-becoming of humanity, a becoming induced by bionic thinking. Research into and development of artificial intelligence start with understanding human intelligence. Mythology and sci-fi narratives are the previous life of and precursor to media. The late Eric McLuhan often compared humanity as the etymology of media. Like most media ecologists, he understood media in a broad sense: a technology is a medium; a medium is an environment. McLuhan and Carson (2003, pp.304 - 305) point out, "Environments are not just containers but are processes that change the content totally." Humans are a core content in them. As an extension of humanity, a medium is a simulation, simplification, reduction, augmentation, offloading, replacement, and obsolescence of some human faculty. For the sake of efficiency, humanity has paid the price of alienation from nature. If nature is humanity's mother, then media are humanity's adopt mother and "second nature", pun intended. Since then, human experience has become an experiencing of media. For example, what one experiences while riding an airplane is not the beautiful scenery along the way but the airplane itself. Today's information environment is both a direct extension of our nervous systems and an information cocoon. As a result, perception gives way to reception, and meaning is detached from experience. In this sense, media are no different than anesthetics. Etymologically speaking, experience is synonymous with aesthetics and antonymous with anesthetics. At this point, de-alienation cannot possibly be realized through de-mediatization. Mystical union with nature can only be induced through special mediums (such as drugs and art) or spiritual exercises. But those moments can only be stumbled upon, rather than purposively pursued. Apollo and Dionysus symbolize two different modes of ours, behind which lie two mediums: logos and alcohol, respectively. To switch media means to switch modes. Switching modes now and then is both what humanity is capable of doing and what it craves to do. The acquisition of self-consciousness is humanity's original sin. This is precisely the meaning of the representative anecdote of Christianity, namely, Paradise Lost. Nanotechnology, genetic engineering,

artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and other high-stake technologies are all embedded within the program initiated by this representative anecdote.

The above view sees media as extensions of humanity. As such, it can be called a simple humanist view of media. Its representative is McLuhan. Yet his thought is not limited to extensionism (i. e., the view of media as extensions of humanity). Good at thinking in terms of chiasmus, McLuhan immediately realizes: aren't humans also extensions, or even trivial accessories, of media! When we row the boat, we become a servomechanism of the boat (McLuhan, 2005, p. 223). Nowadays, humans are forced to become "faceless tentacles of computers" (McLuhan & Nevitt, 1972, p. 129). Inspired by the Victorian satirist Samuel Butler, McLuhan (1995, p. 264) points out, "man thus becomes the sex organs of the machine world just as the bee is of the plant world, permitting it to reproduce and constantly evolve to higher forms." That is to say, between humanity and machines, there is a symbiotic relationship of mutual inclusion. A line by Guan Daosheng 管道升, the Yuan dynasty poetess, captures the relationship well: "There is you in my mud, and me in your mud." Being is interbeing. Nowadays, mental symbiosis between humanity and artificial intelligence is no longer a mere futurological topic. Rapid technological advancement means the evolution of humanity is accelerating. To be more accurate, it is the humanity-media assemblage that is evolving at an accelerating pace. The speeding up takes place *between* humanity and media. This is an issue in which interology is interested.

In retrospect, we can see that extensionism has two sides. On the one hand, humans are incomplete from head to toe. The life script of humans as an open system may include all media. Under various circumstances, if people can respond to things as the evolving situation demands, and thing things rather than being thinged by things, then they can win out over things and not hurt themselves, to invoke the voice of Zhuangzi. This is the ideal of those who practice the Dao. McLuhan and Powers (1989, p. 101) call it robotism, which means instant readjustment to surrounding. Around and within the human body, there exists a profusion of virtuality. Innumerable positions are kept empty for media. Media are material resources for humans to conduct autopoiesis. Each life setting is an opportunity for autopoiesis. When the setting is past, one should completely let go, and revert to Zen poverty, so as to avoid being loaded down by things. On the other

hand, all media set aside in advance a position for humans, or a role for humans to play, and presuppose a type of people with a specific disposition. Such presuppositions serve to call forth and constitute particular kinds of people, but the influence tends to be imperceptible. Compared to a driver who steps on the gas pedal and hums a rock and roll song, a horse rider who keeps their feet in the stirrups and whispers to the horse has a completely different sensibility. The slogan “Guns don’t kill people, people kill people” betrays ignorance toward or deliberate cover-up of the constitutive effect of media upon humans. Expressions like “the body is overstrained by deskbound work” and “the mind is enslaved by things” reflect people’s self-awareness toward their life energy and alertness toward media.

### III. Assemblage Theory

Media shape and even rigidify human postures. Each bodily posture corresponds to a mental posture and a social posture. A knight and a foot soldier are two different types of people entirely. McLuhan and Gilles Deleuze each have their unique understanding of knights as a historical phenomenon. What McLuhan and Quentin Fiore (2001, p. 33) see is the centaur myth and the stirrup as a culturally transformative medium. Put simply, without the stirrup, there wouldn’t have been chivalry, courtly love, and chivalric romance. What Deleuze and Claire Parnet (1987, pp. 69 – 70) see is the man-horse-stirrup assemblage, and the resultant new affect, new symbiosis, and new power. This assemblage’s coming into being induces the double becoming of human and horse. The Spinozan question ( “what a body is capable of”) that interests Deleuze then becomes “what a set of bodies is capable of” or “what an assemblage made up of heterogeneous elements is capable of.” Deleuze and Parnet (1987, p. 70) particularly emphasize:

Tools always presuppose a machine, and the machine is always social before being technical. There is always a social machine which selects or assigns the technical elements used. A tool remains marginal, or little used, until there exists a social machine or collective assemblage which is capable of taking it into its “phylum”.

Furthermore, there are two aspects in an assemblage: things and bodies on the

## □ 符号与传媒 (26)

one hand, and utterances and signs on the other, both of which are components and cogwheels in the assemblage (Deleuze & Parnet, pp. 70 – 71). The concept of assemblage changes the horizon from which we study media. When we view media from the standpoint of the assemblage, we see a different picture. Humanity and media are both elements of the assemblage. There is a relationship of co-functioning between the elements, the meaning of which is up to the assemblage. The subjectivity of a person within the assemblage is no longer preexisting. Rather, it is the product of the assemblage, of concrete relations, of interality, and changes as the assemblage changes. Jakob von Uexküll (2010, p. 182), the German theoretical biologist, articulates a similar idea: the meaning of a flower's stalk is different depending on whether it is in the life of a girl in love, an ant, a cow, or a cicada larva. The reason is that the assemblage it enters is different in each case. To borrow McLuhan's syntax: the assemblage is the message. This view marks a break from the humanist view of media.

### IV. **Anti-Humanism**

The notion of anti-humanism, which Vilém Flusser (n. d.) puts forward in "Phantom City", is consistent with the above viewpoint. The intention is to provisionally withdraw humans from the scene, and then analyze what kinds of human relations are afforded by the environmental setup, which includes technical objects. Ultimately, so-called anti-humanism is still in the interest of humans. In fact, this perspective of Flusser's treats environments as media. The environment is the medium. This insight immediately connects media theory with urban studies. It applies to the ergonomic modulation of work environments, which has become an industry. The entire office furniture industry should redefine the nature of its business in accordance with this way of thinking. It is in the business of the mediumistic programming of work environments, including virtual ones. To apply the idea widely, all artificial environments can be studied as media, including everything from cities (especially their aesthetic layouts) to parks, squares, shopping malls, amusement parks, movie theaters, museums, art galleries, churches, temples, hotels, restaurants, neighborhoods, hospitals, campuses, and even classrooms. McLuhan and Fiore (2001, p. 71) point out, "any controlled

environment, any man-made environment, is a conditioner that creates non-perceptive somnambulists.” In a sense, environments are tangible media, whereas media are hidden environments. Art is a counter-environment that unconceals invisible environments. Through its form, Cubism presents before the audience’s eyes the characteristic of the electric age (i. e. , all-at-onceness). Pointillism puts on display the characteristic of the digital age, namely, the random combination of micro-elements and micro-intervals under the control of programs. In the realm of literature, William S. Burroughs’s cut-up method enacts the same principle. The rise of programmatic thinking means finalism, mechanism, and causal thinking are all left behind. However, humanity is not any freer after extricating itself from the pull of finality and the push of karma. Rather, it is now governed by programs and at the mercy of both chance and necessity. The digital age is an absurd, Kafkaesque age. It is justifiable to call Franz Kafka the prophet of the post-industrial age and the digital age.

## V. Tools, Machines, and Apparatuses

With the advent of the machine age, the contrapuntality between technical objects has become increasingly complex. Humans have been gradually relegated to the position of operators, maintenance personnel, and even spare parts. More and more technical objects have gone beyond the human scale. Between humans and numerous technical objects, intermediary technical objects have emerged. That is to say, humanity is not only increasingly alienated from nature, but also from numerous artifacts of its own making. Harbors and airports are built in accordance with the scale of ships and airplanes. More and more production lines are designed around robots. Current stock exchanges are designed for programs and algorithms. Trading conducted by humans has been rendered obsolescent. Anthropocentrism has more or less bowed out of the stage of history. The ascendance of machinism is a matter of course. As an important perspective in media theory, machinism overcomes the blind spot of humanism or extensionism, and allows us to grasp the human condition more accurately. Flusser ( 2000, pp.23 - 27 ) concisely summarizes a whole series of changes that have occurred over time. In the age of tools, humans as the constant stayed at the center; tools as the variable were placed

around humans. In the machine age, machines as the constant stayed at the center; humans as the variable worked around machines, as if they were flexible cogwheels of the latter. In the age of apparatuses, humans and the apparatus form a unity; the apparatus is a black box, whereas humans are functionaries, who realize the virtuality contained within the program of the apparatus while playing an absurd game with the latter. On very rare occasions, humans can crack the black box, go against the apparatus, and produce outcomes beyond the intention of its program, thereby generating negentropy. Such improbable “events” betoken human freedom. As such, they are the goal pursued by *homo ludens*. This thought has salient ethical significance. In the eyes of Flusser, if the printing press marked the beginning of the industrial age, then the camera marked the beginning of the post-industrial age. The camera is a typical apparatus, and the prototype of the computer. The representative subject in the post-industrial age is the functionary. The functionary is busy changing the meaning of the world, rather than the world itself (Flusser, 2000, p. 25). Production gives way to information processing. Action gives way to symbolic action, tele-action, and virtual action. Reality migrates to the infosphere, cyberspace, and the cloud. *Homo faber* gives way to *homo ludens*. The essential distinction between the functionary and true *homo ludens* is: the former is attached to the apparatus and does its bidding, whereas the latter has free will and a poetic impulse (Flusser calls it an “artistic gesture”), takes the apparatus as an opponent to game with, and sees the creation of negentropy as the ultimate fulfillment in life (2013, p. 138). Flusser (p. 33) sees Adolf Eichmann as a model functionary. This is enough to make all conscientious people in the post-industrial society wary of themselves and the functionalism they have internalized.

## VI. Mechanical, Thermodynamic, and Cybernetic Machines

Theorists have divergent understandings of machines. Deleuze (1995, p. 180) views levers, pulleys, clocks, and other simple mechanical machines as the first generation of machines, which corresponds to the old sovereign societies. Thermodynamic machines are the second generation of machines, which corresponds to recent disciplinary societies. The core characteristic of disciplinary societies is incarceration or confinement of people. The Panopticon is its symbol. Its design



principles apply to factories, hospitals, psychiatric hospitals, and schools perfectly well. A school in Bloomington, Indiana, for example, used to be a prison, which is telling, even if it was not a Panoptic prison. Regarding this point, Michel Foucault's *Discipline and Punish* (1995) is a fascinating theoretical resource, which is highly relevant to the ongoing pandemic. The second generation of machines solves the problem of power. Relative to them, humans inhabit a position of control. Cybernetic machines and computers are the third generation of machines, which corresponds to today's control societies. The third generation of machines has programs in them, and solves the problem of automatic control. Humans have transferred a significant amount of control to such machines, and put themselves in a position of being controlled. The core characteristic of control societies is that humans appear to be free but are surveilled and tracked all the time. Human desire, emotion, thought, and behavior are all manipulated by closed feedback loops. Humans are the captives of such closed feedback loops. Control societies are also societies dominated by technical images. Max Weber's notions of traditional authority, rational-legal authority, and charismatic authority correspond to the three types of societies respectively. Beyond these, it is necessary to put forward the concept of "cybernetic authority", which corresponds to the apparatus culture of control societies. In control societies, various organizations and even such societies in their entirety are increasingly governed by apparatuses. As Flusser (2000, p. 29) points out, programmers of the apparatus are governed by the metaprogram above the apparatus. Their acts of programming are no more than a function of the metaprogram. There are metaprograms above the metaprogram, *ad infinitum*. Deleuze (1995, p. 180) points out, machines do not determine societal types; rather, they only "express the social forms capable of producing them and making use of them". There is Spinozan expressionism behind this understanding. Machines are only components of collective apparatuses. The point is that we need to keep the big picture in mind, and analyze and diagram the apparatus. This line of thought is in keeping with Flusser's viewpoint. To philosophize about the apparatus and reveal the way it governs people is one of the few ways of maintaining a critical distance from it and exercising human agency.

## VII. Natural and Unnatural Machines

In *A Thousand Plateaus*, Deleuze and Félix Guattari (1987) use the term “machinic assemblages” repeatedly. The term is double-sided: on the one hand, there is poetic auto-creation; on the other hand, there is machinic enslavement of humans. The former is active and ethical. The latter is unethical or anti-ethical since it indicates the captivity of humans. It bears pointing out that Deleuze has a specific, subtle understanding of machinism. For him, machinism and vitalism are at one with each other. His inspiration comes from Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. Leibniz holds that mechanical things are finite machines whose ultimate components are no longer machines, whereas machines of nature or living beings are different, in the sense that their smallest components are still machines, *ad infinitum* (Deleuze, 1987). In this sense, calling the human body a machine is by no means an obsolete metaphor. According to this understanding, to graft onto or transplant into the human body unnatural machines constitutes a degradation or profanation of the human body. Although dog lungs carry a stigma in Chinese, they are far better than ventilators. There is no comparison between them. Research and development in the field of genetic engineering and the appearance of genetic robots will make fuzzy the boundary between natural and unnatural machines. This is one of the things the late Paul Virilio, the French thinker associated with dromology, grey ecology, bunker archaeology, and the oblique function, among other things, was deeply worried about. What is Deleuze’s real understanding of or attitude toward posthumans? This is a question that deserves further discussion. Deleuze’s vitalist thought has a Bergsonian flavor and a Leibnizian foundation. The machines under discussion here are obviously not limited to natural machines. In the historical period (i. e., the period after the invention of writing) and the post-historical period (the period after the invention of technical images), humanity faced/faces a scenario in which either unnatural machines prevail(ed) over natural machines or both were/are taken up by machinic assemblages. Speaking of this, it is necessary to discuss the concept of megamachines put forward by Lewis Mumford, and its applicability in or retrofitting for the digital age.

### VIII. The Evolution of Megamachines

Mumford (1967, p. 191) holds that machines are made up of “resistant parts, each specialized in function, operating under human control, to utilize energy and to perform work”. In ancient times, there were two kinds of megamachine: the military machine and the labor machine. Both needed to send orders down the hierarchy and therefore depended upon the written word. Pyramidal discourse was their predominant means of communication. The components of the labor machine, “though made of human bone, nerve, and muscle, were reduced to their bare mechanical elements and rigidly standardized for the performance of their limited tasks. The taskmaster’s lash ensured conformity” (p. 191). Besides coercion, the ancient megamachine also benefited from “an awe-inducing religion and a ritual of divine worship that would gain by mass suggestion a more complete submission and more abject obedience than terror alone can achieve” (1970, p. 247). Ancient labor machines made pyramids and other large-scale works possible. Kafka’s story, “The Great Wall of China” (1971, pp. 235 – 248), is an illuminating source in this regard. By comparison, the modern megamachine “has progressively reduced the number of human agents and multiplied the more reliable mechanical and electronic components; not merely reducing the labor force needed for a colossal operation but facilitating instantaneous remote control” (Mumford, 1970, p. 258). Charlie Chaplin’s 1936 film, *Modern Times*, realistically portrays humanity’s situation within modern industrial megamachines. The precondition for functioning within modern industrial megamachines is machinization or machine becoming, and the body’s becoming docile. The modern megamachine “escapes spatial and temporal limitations; it can operate as a single, largely invisible unit, over a wide area, with its functioning parts operating as a whole through instant communication” (p. 258). The so-called military scientific complex is an example of modern megamachines. Without modern megamachines, there would not have been the atomic bomb and manned flights to the Moon.

What Mumford did not expect was that in the digital age, there appeared digital megamachines like Facebook, whose terminals could pervade the entire globe, and whose users could reach several billion. Under neither coercion nor discipline, huge

numbers of users voluntarily work without compensation in exchange for the convenience of having phatic communions and exchanging gossips with numerous people, identified or unidentified, in cyberspace. Digital megamachines generate advertising revenues through capturing users' attention. Large numbers of users flip into labor, and work without asking for even micro-compensation, thus accelerating the concentration of wealth (the Mathew effect). The big data thus generated greatly facilitate the training of artificial intelligence. In modern industrial megamachines, humans existed as "individuals". The word comes from "*individuum*", implying "indivisible". In digital megamachines, humans are relegated as "dividuals". Digital megamachines are largely invisible and bring with them a new economic paradigm based on the capture of attention. They provide the material basis for what Virilio (2009, p. 43) calls integral accidents (e. g., globe-wide stock market crashes and panic). In the age of digital megamachines, traditional ontology is bound to give way to interology. Mumford (1970, p. 293) brings up in passing the potential appearance of "an electronic anti-megamachine programmed to accelerate disorder, ignorance, and entropy". This notion applies to Facebook perfectly well. Deleuze and Guattari adopt the concept of megamachines in *A Thousand Plateaus*. Like Mumford, they are machinists. Machinism and assemblage theory both foreground the interality between humans and technical objects and the scene in which they are situated. As such, they both have a materialist tendency.

## IX. Concluding Remarks

"The world turns. Time flies."<sup>①</sup> Inadvertently, we have already stepped into the 2020s. Neural networks, the Internet of things, blockchain, quantum computing, artificial intelligence, ambience intelligence, genome editing, 5G, and other technologies simply bedazzle us. Social media have turned private thoughts and the sensation of missing somebody into a luxury and made thinking an abnormality. The dwindling of the unconditioned mind of Dao and the expansion of the conditioned human mind are worsening by the day. The more jumbled media

---

① This is a line from a poem by Mao Zedong.

are, the farther away the human mind is from the mind of Dao. In an age when media are unprecedentedly prosperous, ethics itself can no longer solve ethical problems. Whether it assumes other guises or not, media theory, whose vitality lies in explorations alone, is not entropy-proof and badly needs to search for new philosophical paths. Against such a backdrop, Flusser's media philosophy, which breathes phenomenological and futurological breaths, has been refreshing. Systematic study of his thought and further discussion of his works are in order. Furthermore, the heuristic value of interology, which is a philosophy of the future and a praxial philosophy, for media theory is not to be underestimated. For one thing, the new technologies listed above all have close connections with interological thinking. The times call for the genesis of a new scholarly community. Interality is precisely the way such a community generates itself.

#### Works Cited:

- Deleuze, G. (1995). *Negotiations*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Deleuze, G. (1987). Leibniz and the Baroque/12. Retrieved from <https://deleuze.cla.purdue.edu/seminars/leibniz-and-baroque/lecture-12>.
- Deleuze, G. , & Guattari, F. (1987). *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Deleuze, G. , & Parnet, C. (1987). *Dialogues*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Flusser, V. (2013). *Post-history*. Minneapolis: Univocal Publishing.
- Flusser, V. (2000). *Towards A Philosophy of Photography*. London: Reaktion Books.
- Flusser, V. (1999). *The Shape of Things: A Philosophy of Design*. London: Reaktion Books.
- Flusser, V. (n. d.). Phantom City. Retrieved from <http://flusserbrasil.com/arte125.pdf>.
- Foucault, M. (1995). *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*. New York: Vintage Books.
- Hori, V. S. (Trans. ). (2010). *Zen Sand: The Book of Capping Phrases for Kōan Practice*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
- Kafka, F. (1971). *Franz Kafka: The Complete Stories*. New York: Schocken Books.
- McLuhan, M. (2005). *Understanding Me*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
- McLuhan, M. (1995). *Essential McLuhan*. New York: BasicBooks.
- McLuhan, M. (1994). *Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
- McLuhan, M. , & Carson, D. (2003). *The Book of Probes*. Corte Madera, CA: Ginko Press.
- McLuhan, M. , & Fiore, Q. (2001). *War and Peace in the Global Village*. Corte Madera, CA:

## □ 符号与传媒 (26)

- Ginko Press.
- McLuhan, M. , & Powers, B. (1989). *The Global Village*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Mumford, L. (1970). *The Pentagon of Power*. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World.
- Mumford, L. (1967). *The Myth of the Machine*. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World.
- Shang, G. (2015). Interality Shows through: An Introduction to Interology. *China Media Research*, 11 (2): 68 – 79.
- Zhang, P. (2021). Deleuze and Khora. *China Media Research*, 17 (3): 55 – 71.
- Zhang, P. (2019). Toward an Interlaity-oriented Philosophy (IOP) of the Digital. *China Media Research*, 15 (4): 13 – 22.
- Virilio, P. (2009). *Grey Ecology*. New York: Atropos Press.
- Von Uexküll, J. (2010). *A Foray into the Worlds of Animals and Humans: With A Theory of Meaning*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

### **Author:**

Xianguang Peter Zhang, Ph. D., professor in the School of Politics, Law, and Public Administration, Yan'an University, PRC and the School of Communications at Grand Valley State University, USA. His research interests include media theory, Deleuze, and interology.

### **作者简介:**

张先广，博士，延安大学政法与公共管理学院、美国格兰谷州立大学传播学院教授，研究兴趣包括媒介理论、德勒兹、间性论。

Email: zhangp@gvsu.edu