Interpretation as Protention: The Temporal Mechanism of the Process of Interpreting
Dong Minglai
Abstract: This paper will try to clarify the mode according to which a text is given to a consciousness in time. By introducing time theories from Bergson and Husserl, I will attempt to describe two main characteristics of such consciousness. First, I will argue that the original given of temporal objects is not some homogeneous and mathematical points juxtaposed in a homogeneous medium but a whole of some heterogeneous qualities, which he calls as duration. This means that impressions in time are differentiated not by different positions that they hold in an empty space, but by their own qualities. Therefore, signs manifested in the stream of consciousness are also distinguished from each other also by their own appearances. Further, these appearances of different signs in time consciousness are connected to each other in the mode of time which Husserl describes as retention and protention, especially protention. In order to understand a text, interpretation must be expecting some contents “in the future”, so that the “current sign” can be distinguished from “signs to come”. The second part of this paper is to focus on multiple characteristics involved in this action of interpretation as anticipation, including its relation to a past as its passive guidance, its applications on different levels of texts, and its possibility of being “disappointed”.
Keywords: phenomenology, time consciousness, interpretation, Husserl, Bergson, semiotics
作为前瞻的解释：论解释过程的时间机制
董明来
摘要：本文试图澄清文本被给予时间意识的基本方式。在柏格森和胡塞尔时间哲学的基础上，我将试图描绘时间意识的两个主要特征。首先，根据柏格森，对象在时间中的原初给予并非一些同质的，数学性的“点”在一个同质中介中的单纯并列，而是一些不同质的感知的整体：柏格森将这种整体称为“延续”。在延续中被给予的乃是不同的印象，这并非因为他们在一个空洞空间中占据了不同的位置，而是因为他们本身就拥有各自不同的特质。从而，在意识中展开的符号们可以就它们本身不同的感知而被区分，而不必依赖于抽象的组合轴位置。进一步的，根据胡塞尔，不同符号乃是在时间意识中被联结的：他把这种原初的时间意识描绘为一个由前瞻和后顾所组成的场域， 而解释行为则主要是一种前瞻。在理解一个文本时，解释必须能够“期待某些处于未来中的内容”，从而“当下的符号”才能和“将要到来的符号”相区分。本文的第二部分将着重描述这种作为前瞻的解释行为的诸种特质，包括以一种消极综合的方式作为其引导的过去经验，它在不同文本层面上的具体面貌，以及其“期待”落空的诸种可能。
